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The public perceives the typical corporation as a large publicly-
owned conglomerate. However, most corporate activity actually is con-
ducted through small closely-held companies.' The corporate continuum
extends from the incorporated sole proprietorship to the diversified
multinational corporation. Notwithstanding the dichotomy of corporate
form, the judicial system applies the same set of legal precepts to
both ends of the spectrum. This judicial myopia may lead to pernicious
case decisions; however, some courts have begun to restructure their
judicial analysis to compensate for legislative inadequacies.! This
emerging judicial reorientation centers on a recognition of the simi-
larities between the small closely-held corporation and the partner-
ship entity.3
Close corporations are unique primarily because of the personal,
intimate, on-going association of the shareholders. This relationship
gives rise to shareholder expectations which may include their par-
ticipation in management, long-term employment, and periodic divi-
dend distributions. These bargained-for expectations of shareholders
in a close corporation rarely are outlined in the corporate by-laws.
The parties' true intent "may not even be in writing but may have
to be construed from their actions."4 Some of the legal disputes decided
Copyright 1982, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. The definition of a closely-held corporation tends to vary among academicians.
For a discussion of the various views on the limits of "closely-held," see Soderquist,
Reconciling Shareholders' Rights and Corporate Responsibility: Close and Small Public
Corporations, 33 VAND. L. REV. 1387, 1391 (1980). See, e.g., Donahue v. Rodd Electrotype
Co., 367 Mass. 578, 328 N.E.2d 505 (1975).
2. Hetherington & Dooley, Illiquidity and Exploitation: A Proposed Statutory Solu-
tion to the Remaining Close Corporation Problem, 63 VA. L. REV. 1, 7 (1977). The
jurisprudence recognizes that an equity court can order dissolution of a solvent cor-
poration independent of statutory authority for such action. See Bellevue Gardens, Inc.
v. Hill, 297 F.2d 185 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Bailey v. Proctor, 160 F.2d 78 (1st Cir.), cert
denied, 331 U.S. 834 (1947); Miner v. Belle Isle Ice Co., 93 Mich. 97, 53 N.W. 218 (1892);
Leibert v. Clapp, 13 N.Y.2d 313, 196 N.E.2d 540, 247 N.Y.S.2d 102 (1963).
3. See, e.g., Nelkin v. H.J.R. Realty Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 543, 255 N.E.2d 713, 307
N.Y.S.2d 454 (1969); Kruger v. Gerth, 16 N.Y.2d 802, 210 N.E.2d 355, 263 N.Y.S.2d
1 (1965) (Fuld, J., dissenting); Weiss v. Gordon, 32 A.D.2d 279, 301 N.Y.S.2d 839 (1969).
4. Topper v. Park Sheraton Pharmacy, Inc., 107 Misc. 2d 25, 33, 433 N.Y.S.2d
359, 365 (Sup. Ct. 1980). An arbitrary application of the "majority rule" concept often
deviates from the true expectations of the parties.
Not uncommonly a participant in a closely held enterprise invests all his assets
in the business with an expectation, often reasonable under the circumstances
even in the absence of an express contract, that he will be a key employee in
the company and will have a voice in business decisions. When courts apply the
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by the Louisiana courts in the past year may be characterized as in-
volving shareholder expectations.5 The shareholders' anticipated
business association is subject to change as the enterprise develops.
A judicial solution to close corporation problems should favor equitable
considerations over strict legal analysis of the legislative remedies;
otherwise, the majority shareholders are free to exploit the minority
interest solely for their own benefit.'
Some legal theoreticians contend that close corporations are in-
distinguishable from their publicly-traded counterparts and refuse to
recognize a legal dichotomy between closely-held and publicly-owned
corporations. The proponents of this thesis maintain that the
shareholders can set up contractual arrangements in anticipation of
necessitous circumstances.7 However, those stockholders who fail to
bargain for and obtain protective contractual arrangements must
resort to the state's statutory framework.' Professor O'Neal has
observed that
[a]s minority participants in a close corporation may not anticipate
dissension or oppression, and indeed may be unaware of their
vulnerability, they frequently fail to bargain for adequate protec-
tion against mistreatment. In view of this widespread failure of
minority shareholders to use self-help, commentators and
legislative draftsmen might well turn their attention to ways of
providing automatic statutory protection?
principle of majority rule in close corporations, they often disappoint the reasonable
expectations of minority participants.
O'Neal, Close Corporations: Existing Legislation and Recommended Reform, 33 Bus. LAW.
873, 884 (1978). See also Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141,
400 A.2d 554 (Law Div. 1979), and text at note 45, infra.
5. See text at notes 12-45, infra.
6. O'Neal, supra note 4, at 887.
7. This alternative is both useful and well-used. However, the contractual option
as a solution to closely held corporation problems is really somewhat of a paradox.
The emphasis on contractual arrangements reveals a fundamental misunderstand-
ing of the nature of close corporations. Whether the parties adopt special con-
tractual arrangements is much less important than their ability to sustain a close,
harmonious relationship over time. The continuance of such a relationship is crucial
because it reflects what is perhaps the fundamental assumption made by those
who decide to invest in a close corporation: they expect that during the life of
the firm the shareholders will be in substantial agreement as to its operation.
Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 2, at 2. See the authorities cited in note 4, supra.
8. The need for adequate self-executing protection for minority shareholders has
been recognized by a few states. See note 23, infra. Where the shareholder has failed
to contractually protect himself and state law is insensitive to his needs, the courts
are often unable to provide a remedy. This is at least a partial, if not complete, ex-
planation for the incongruous outcome in Streb v. Abramson-Caro Clinic, 401 So. 2d
410 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 403 So. 2d 69 (La. 1981). See text at notes 12-45, infra.
9. O'Neal, supra note 4, at 881-82. For a progressive example of state legislation
protecting minority rights, see S.C. CODE ANN. S 33-21-155 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1981).
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The Louisiana statutory framework appears to be inadequate for the
protection of shareholders in a close corporation." Moreover, the defi-
ciencies of Louisiana corporate law are not only restricted to share-
holder inequities but also extend to creditors.
Although numerous cases 1 in the corporate area have been
litigated in the past year, only three appellate decisions clearly
highlight the conflicts between general corporate law and the prob-
lems uniquely inherent in a closely-held corporation. The first case
involves the oppression of minority interests, the second one addresses
the rights of creditors when a corporation becomes insolvent, and the
third decision briefly examines the authority of officers and directors
to contract for the corporation. All three decisions are discussed and
analyzed in the context of a close corporation, a setting which often
precludes the application of general corporate principles.
The Oppression of Minority Shareholders
Streb v. Abramson-Caro Clinic2 illustrates a situation where the
court's overreliance on the doctrine of majority rule" precluded their
granting relief to an oppressed shareholder. The plaintiff in Streb and
two other doctors formed a professional medical corporation; dissen-
sion and friction subsequently followed, culminating in the removal
of the plaintiff from the board of directors and the termination of
his employment with the corporation. The plaintiff prayed for a judicial
or involuntary dissolution 4 of the corporation. Both the district court
and the first circuit concluded that the excluded doctor had failed to
state a cause of action for involuntary dissolution."
The actions of the majority shareholders resulted in an effective
10. The corporate statutory scheme seems more attuned to large publicly-owned cor-
porations. See, e.g., LA. R.S. 12:143 (Supp. 1968, 1970 &1976). But see LA. R.S. 12:151(A)(5)
(Supp. 1968).
11. See, e.g., DeFelice v. Garon, 395 So. 2d 658 (La. 1980) (voting trust agreement);
Donnelly v. Handy, 415 So. 2d 478 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982) (officer's personal liability
for tortious conduct); Hamm v. Southeast La. Emergency Medical Serv. Council, Inc.,
414 So. 2d 835 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1982) (officer's authority to contract); Groves v. Rose-
mound Improvement Ass'n, Inc., 413 So. 2d 925 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1982) (voting rights
of shareholders); Southern-Gulf Marine Co. No. 9, Inc. v. Camcraft, Inc., 410 So. 2d
1181 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1982) (corporate capacity to contract); Fireplace Shop, Inc. v.
Fireplace Shop of Lafayette, Inc., 400 So. 2d 702 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1981) (appointment
of a receiver).
12. 401 So. 2d 410 (La. App. 1st Cir.), writ denied, 403 So. 2d 69 (La. 1981).
13. See the authorities cited in note 4, supra, and text at note 45, infra.
14. See LA. R.S. 12:143 (Supp. 1968, 1970 & 1976).
15. The court remanded the case because it perceived the possibility that the
plaintiff could amend his pleadings so as to be entitled to some relief. 401 So. 2d at
414. A conceivable remedy for the plaintiff might exist under LA. R.S. 12:161 (Supp.
1968). See also LA. R.S. 12:905(B) (Supp. 1979).
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"freeze-out"16 of the minority shareholder's interest. Because of the
lack of a readily available market for the corporate stock,17 the plain-
tiff could be afforded complete relief only by a dissolution of the cor-
poration. Commentators have recognized that the dissolution of an
on-going, profitable 8 business entity is a drastic remedy. 9 This cautious
trepidation originates in the judiciary's failure to treat closely-held
corporations as comparable to partnerships."
When applied to publicly held corporations, corporate law
generally functions adequately to protect all interests. However,
the same law, when applied to close corporations, is not equally
efficacious.
The lack of special treatment for close corporations, either
statutory or judicial, results in a number of situations in which
minority shareholders are oppressed and squeezed-out by a schem-
ing majority. Traditional corporate law tends to limit judicial in-
tervention only to those situations involving the most egregious
conduct.2
A remedy for the preclusion of minority rights is acknowledged and
supported by the judiciary of all states. As such, the Louisiana
judiciary should formulate an adequate remedy until our legislature
fills the statutory void. The Streb court's analysis was correct, but
the functional accuracy of its analysis was undermined by the court's
failure to provide any relief.
In the early 1960's, some state courts began to take a renewed
16. See F. O'NEAL, OPPRESSION OF MINORITY SHAREHOLDERS (1975); F. O'NEAL & J.
DERWIN, EXPULSION OR OPPRESSION OF BUSINESS ASSOCIATES (1961).
17. 401 So. 2d at 413.
18. The presence or absence of a positive net income should not deter a court
from applying the appropriate remedy. See Comment, Relief to Oppressed Minorities
in Close Corporations: Partnership Precepts and Related Considerations, 1974 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 409, 424; see also Chayes, Madame Wagner and the Close Corporation, 73 HARV.
L. REV. 1532,1546 (1960). Furthermore, the practical effect of most remedies for oppressed
minorities leaves the enterprise intact. The firms which are liquidated "are those
that neither the majority nor anyone else finds sufficiently profitable to continue. Firms
in that category can hardly be described as 'viable,' and their passing will not occa-
sion any social cost." Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 2, at 50.
19. "The two principal conceptual barriers to the courts' granting relief to ag-
grieved minority shareholders-the principle of majority rule in corporate manage-
ment and the business judgment rule-actually have only limited validity in small
business corporations." O'Neal, supra note 4, at 884. See generally Soderquist, supra
note 1, at 1410-13; Comment, supra note 18, at 414-15; Note, Close Corporations: Strict
Good Faith Fiduciary Duty Applied to Controlling Stockholders, 38 LA. L. REV. 214,
216-17 (1977).
20. See authorities cited at note 3, supra. But see Baker v. Commercial Body
Builders, Inc., 260 Or. 614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973); Jackson v. Nicolai-Neppach Co., 219
Or. 560, 348 P.2d 9 (1959).
21. Comment, supra note 18, at 413. See F. O'NEAL, 1 CLOSE CORPORATIONS: LAW
AND PRACTICE § 3.03, 3.04, 3.06, 5.05 (2d ed. 1971).
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approach to minority relief and the traditional concepts of involun-
tary dissolution." As a result, state legislatures adopted specific
reforms to remedy the corporate preclusion of minority interests.23
The majority of these statutes contain provisions which prohibit the
directors or those in control of a corporation from acting "in a man-
ner that is illegal, oppressive, fraudulent, or unfairly prejudicial" 4 to
any shareholder. To date, Louisiana has not adopted an equivalent
legislative proposal. The inordinate result in Streb suggests the need
for legislative amelioration of the consequences. Judicial interpreta-
tions in states which proscribe these activities provide testamentary
proof of the economic necessity and functional workability of such
statutes.
In a situation like Streb, a court relying on an "oppression-type"
statute 25 understandably could conclude that the conduct of the ma-
jority was oppressive." Oppression, in and of itself, is an independent
ground for relief which does not require a showing of fraud, illegali-
ty, mismanagement, or wasting of assets." A definition of oppression
and conduct which meets its criteria is difficult to articulate. A general
consensus adumbrates that oppression can be characterized as a lack
of probity and fair dealing in the affairs of the enterprise to the pre-
judice of some portion of its members.' Commentators repeatedly have
recognized that
22. See, e.g., Gidwitz v. Lanzit Corrugated Box Co., 20 Ill. 2d 208, 170 N.E.2d 131
(1960); Central Standard Life Ins. Co. v. Davis, 10 Ill. 2d 566, 141 N.E.2d 45 (1957);
Polikoff v. Dole & Clark Bldg. Corp., 37 Ill. App. 2d 29, 184 N.E.2d 792 (1962); see
also Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976), and the authorities
cited in note 2, supra.
23. See CAL. CORP. CODE 5 1800 (West 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 32, S 157.86(a)(3)
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1982); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN. S 4-603 (1975); MICH. COMP.
LAWS ANN. § 450.1825 (1978); MINN. STAT. ANN. S 302A.75(b)(2) (West 1981); Mo. ANN. STAT.
S 351.485 (Vernon Supp. 1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 14A:12-7 (West Supp. 1982); N.Y. Bus.
CORP. LAW S 1104 (McKinney 1963); R.I. GEN. LAWS S 7-1.1-90 (1970); S.C. CODE ANN. §
33-21-155 (Law. Co-op Supp. 1981); W. VA. CODE § 31-1-134 (1982). See also Committee
on Corporate Laws, Proposed Statutory Close Corporation Supplement to the Model
Business Corporation Act, 37 Bus. LAW. 269, 299-306 (1981).
24. Committee on Corporate Laws, supra note 23, at 300 (quoting the proposed
supplement to Model Business Corp. Act S 16(a)(1)).
25. See the statutes cited in note 23, supra.
26. But see Exadaktilos v. Cinnaminson Realty Co., 167 N.J. Super. 141, 400 A.2d
554 (Law Div. 1979); Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 507 P.2d
387 (1973).
27. See Compton v. Harding Realty Co., 6 Ill. App. 3d 488, 285 N.E.2d 574 (1972).
28. See Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Baker v. Com-
mercial Body Builders, Inc., 264 Or. 614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973); White v. Perkins, 213
Va. 129, 189 S.E.2d 315 (1972). Oppression has been defined in the English Companies
Act as "a visible departure from the standards of fair dealing, and a violation of the
conditions of fair play on which every shareholder who entrusts his money to a com-
pany is entitled to rely." Elder v. Elder & Watson, Ltd., 1952 Sess. Cas. 49, 55 (Scot.),
quoted in Fix, 538 S.W.2d at 358.
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[c]ircumstances which may give rise to "oppression" are "so in-
finitely various that it is impossible to define them with preci-
sion." It might be added, moreover, that any attempt to define
"oppressive" would tend to reduce the flexibility of the provision.
"Oppressive" is no less vague or abstruse than "fiduciary duty"
or "trust relationship," phrases which have been productively
employed.'
The initial judicial analysis involves a juxtaposition of the factual
background against the judicial policy outlines of oppressive conduct.
The plaintiff in Streb alleged that his removal would occasion finan-
cial hardship not only because of the termination of his employment
but also because of the loss of accrued pension benefits and uncollected
accounts receivable.' Hence, in Streb, expulsion by majority vote
allegedly resulted in long-term economic distress. The courts' reluc-
tance to dissolve the entity arose from the perceived lack of statutory
authorization;" however, the lack of legislative approval should not
prevent a court from protecting and enforcing shareholder rights.
A judicious evaluation of the relationship between directors and
shareholders can protect shareholder's rights. Directors and majority
shareholders are deemed to stand in a fiduciary relationship to the
minority shareholders. 2 This relationship in a close corporation has
been qualified as more akin to that of partners than to corporate
stockholders. Furthermore, at least one state court has opined that
cases involving the fiduciary duty owed by directors and majority
stockholders vis-a-vis the minority embrace the same standard which
other courts have evolved under the term "oppressive conduct."3
Using a similar analysis under the Streb facts would allow a court
to impose the equitable remedy of dissolution upon concluding that
the majority shareholders had breached the fiduciary duty owed to
29. Comment, Oppression as a Statutory Ground for Corporate Dissolution, 1965
DUKE L.J. 128, 140-41; see the authorities cited in note 28, supra.
30. 401 So.2d at 412-13.
31. See the authorities cited in note 2, supra.
32. See, e.g., Mardel Securities, Inc. v. Alexandria Gazette Corp., 320 F.2d 890
(4th Cir. 1963); Mims v. Valley Nat'l Bank, 14 Ariz. App. 190, 481 P.2d 876 (1971);
Galler v. Galler, 95 Il. App. 2d 340, 238 N.E.2d&274 (1968); Fix v. Fix Material Co.,
538 S.W.2d 351 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Zidell v. Zidell, Inc., 277 Or. 413, 560 P.2d 1086
(1977); Seaboard Indus., Inc. v. Monaco, 442 Pa. 256, 276 A.2d 305 (1971). There is no
justification for the concept that the fiduciary duty flows only to the corporation and
not to the minority shareholders. In close corporations, the only utility of the cor-
porate fiduciary duty concept is the control of abusive self-dealing and fraudulent misap-
propriation of assets. Adelman v. Conotti Corp., 215 Va. 782, 213 S.E.2d 774 (1975);
Cain v. Cain, 334 N.E.2d 650 (Mass. App. Ct. 1975). In all other situations in close
corporations, the firm's interest is the "alter ego" of the majority's interest.
33. See the authorities cited in note 3, supra.
34. See Masinter v. Webco Co., 262 S.E.2d 433, 440 (W. Va. 1980).
[Vol. 43
DEVELOPMENTS IN THE LAW, 1981-1982
the minority shareholders. 5 Although this indirect approach seems
contrary to the statutory basis of dissolution,36 it has been sanctioned
in other jurisdictions37 and ostensibly would be permissible in Loui-
siana as well.
When the court concludes that the minority shareholders have
been oppressed by the squeeze-out technique, they need only apply
the proper remedy. The plaintiff in oppression-type cases generally
seeks judicial dissolution of the corporate enterprise, but dissolution
is not a panacea for shareholder dissension. Fortunately, the number
of remedies available to a court far exceed the singular remedy of
corporate death.' This is not to say that dissolution is inherently disad-
vantageous. In involuntary dissolution cases, the courts assume that
a decree will result in the termination of the business. The judicial
reluctance to grant dissolution springs from the perceived public in-
terest in continuing profitable firms. The concern of the courts is
misplaced because of their misconception of the ultimate effect of a
dissolution decree.
In practical effect a decree is no different than the dissolution
of a partnership. The entry of a decree results in the termination
of the business only if both the majority and the minority
shareholders desire that result. Each faction has the ability at any
stage of the proceeding to insure the continued existence of the
firm by buying out, or selling out to, the other faction. The
35. See generally Petrick v. B-K Dynamics, Inc., 283 A.2d 696 (Del. Ch. 1971); Keck
v. Schumacher, 198 So.2d 39 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1967); Holden v. Construction Mach.
Co., 202 N.W.2d 348 (Iowa 1972); Wilkes v. Springside Nursing Home, Inc., 370 Mass.
842, 353 N.E.2d 657 (1976); Ruetz v. Topping, 453 S.W.2d 624 (Mo. App. Ct. 1970); Note,
supra note 19.
36. LA. R.S. 12:143(A) (Supp. 1968). At least one commentator views the contractual
relationship of close corporation shareholders as including the right of recession. The
minority is said to have a right to rescind the agreement if the majority has failed
to comply with the contract, i.e., to operate the business in the best interests of all
participants. Comment, Minority Dissolution of the Close Corporation, 35 GEO. WASH.
L. REV. 1068, 1079 (1967); see also Hornstein, A Remedy for Corporate Abuse-Judicial Power
to Wind Up a Corporation at the Suit of a Minority Stockholder, 40 COLUM. L. REV.
220 (1940).
37. See the authorities cited in notes 3, 23 & 35, supra.
38. See text at note 19, supra. The existence of the dissolution remedy may be
just as helpful as its actual use.
If dissolution is denied . . .a settlement is perhaps less likely to occur, at least
initially. Having failed in his effort to compel the defendant to buy him out .
. .the petitioner's bargaining position becomes much weaker. After successfully
resisting the challenge to his control, the defendant now has no more, and pro-
bably less, reason to purchase the petitioner's interest than he had before the
suit was brought.
Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 2, at 28.
39. Hetherington & Dooley, supra note 2, at 27.
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business will cease only if continuing it is not in the interest of
any of its shareholders.
4I
Nonetheless, most courts have concluded that the interminable con-
sequences of dissolution require that less onerous alternatives be
employed." Commensurate with this judicial policy, many states now
have recognized that a dissolution statute does not provide the ex-
clusive remedy for injured shareholders; equity may require the court
to fashion a more appropriate remedy."' For example, some states have
enacted legislation that grants a court the power to appoint a custo-
dian to run a close corporation if the controlling shareholders act
fraudulently or oppressively. 43 A court may appoint a receiver to deter-
mine a per share value and allow one faction to buy out the other.
Discretionary provisional remedies, such as an injunction to prohibit
certain conduct or a mandamus to compel the payment of dividends,
are additional substitute means of redress." The goal of these alter-
natives is to provide more inclusive and flexible grounds for relief.
40. Id. Dissolution is often only a pretense to force the controlling faction to buy
out the minority interest.
41. The courts are faced with an anomalous situation in which the remedy of forced
dissolution may be equally "oppressive" to the majority shareholders. See Baker v.
Commercial Body Builders, Inc., 260 Or. 614, 507 P.2d 387 (1973). Moreover, the ter-
mination of the enterprise may disfavor the minority in economic terms. "In many
instances minority shareholders will not benefit from liquidation because the liquida-
tion value of company assets may be small or the only available purchaser may be
the very majority whose oppression drove the minority to seek redress." O'Neal, supra
note 4, at 882.
42. See Roach v. Margulies, 42 N.J. Super. 243, 126 A.2d 45 (1956); Patton v.
Nicholas, 154 Tex. 385, 279 S.W.2d 848 (1955); White v. Perkins, 213 Va. 129, 189 S.E.2d
315 (1972).
43. See N.J. STAT. ANN. S 14A:12-7(1)(c) (West Supp. 1982); VA. CODE § 13.1-94 (1978).
44. See the representative state statutes cited in note 23, supra. Most of these
states have recognized a number of equitable remedies that depend on the facts in
the case presented and the nature of the problems involved. These remedies may in-
clude dissolution under a suspensive condition, appointment of a receiver, court super-
vision of minority interests, injunctions to prohibit oppressive conduct, mandamus to
compel dividend payments or capital distributions, or an award of damages to injured
minority shareholders. See Fix v. Fix Material Co., 538 S.W.2d 351, 357 n. 3 (Mo. Ct.
App. 1976).
It has been suggested that legislation requiring compulsory arbitration of cor-
porate disputes might be successful. . . .A forum would be offered for dealing
with controversies before they reached that level of hostility which makes recon-
ciliation impossible. At the same time, arbitration avoids the traditional judicial
reluctance to intervene in the internal affairs of the corporation.
Afterman, Statutory Protection for Oppressed Minority Shareholders: A Model for Reform,
55 VA. L. REV. 1043, 1077 n. 148 (1969). Even with the increased availability and recogni-
tion of alternative remedies, the remedy of dissolution is still the most frequently
used safeguard of minority rights. See Notzke v. Art Gallery, Inc., 84 Ill. App. 3d
294, 405 N.E.2d 839 (1980); Delaney v. Georgia-Pacific Corp., 278 Or. 305, 564 P.2d
277 (1977).
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The Streb decision effectively closes the door on many minority
grievances. Streb personifies the judicial hesitancy to encroach upon
the time-honored doctrine of majority rule. The judiciary can and
should grant relief to oppressed minority shareholders; moreover, the
imposition of an equitable remedy does not have to await legislative
prescription. Concededly, any judicial redirection necessitates an ex-
amination of the majority rights as well."5 However, a viable solution
requires a balancing of the competing equities involved, as the pre-
sent scales are unbalanced.
Insolvent Corporations: Insider Preferential Transactions and Creditor
Rights
The fiduciary nature of the officers' and directors' positions within
a corporation imposes standards which govern any transaction between
these insiders and the corporate entity.46 Any unfair transaction made
possible by a fiduciary relationship between the parties gives rise to
liability with respect to the unjust enrichment of the fiduciary.
Specifically, courts and commentators universally recognize that "[a]
transaction by an officer or director with the corporation he serves
which grants to him, as a bona fide but unsecured creditor of the
corporation, preferred status over other unsecured creditors at a time
when the corporation is known to be insolvent, is invalid. '4 7 Against
this background of legal precepts, the case of Missouri Meat Co. v.
Richard 8 was argued and resolved.
The plaintiffs in Missouri Meat, judgment creditors of a defunct
corporation, sought reparation from the former owners of the insol-
vent corporation under sections 92 and 93 of the Louisiana Corpora-
tion Law. 9 The plaintiffs argued that the insiders violated their
fiduciary duty to outside creditors when they granted a second mort-
gage on corporate property to cover antecedent debts owed by the
corporation to the insiders.' The plaintiffs further alleged that this
second security interest restricted buyers from bidding on the assets
of the corporation at a subsequent foreclosure sale, causing the assets
45. "After all, the remedy of a forced dissolution of a corporation may be equally
'oppressive' to the majority stockholders." Baker v. Commercial Body Builders, Inc.,
264 Or. 614, 630, 507 P.2d 387, 394 (1973).
46. See 15A W. FLETCHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS S 7412
(1967); W. KNEPPER, LIABILITY OF CORPORATE OFFICERS AND DIRECTORS S 2.13 (3d ed. 1978).
47. Missouri Meat Co. v. Richard, 407 So. 2d 17, 21 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1981), writ
granted, 412 So. 2d 87 (La. 1982); see Abraham v.*Lake Forest, Inc., 377 So. 2d 465
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1979), writ denied, 380 So. 2d 99 (La. 1980).
48. 407 So. 2d 17 (La. App. 3d. Cir. 1981), writ granted, 412 So. 2d 87 (La. 1982).
49. LA. R.S. 12:92 & 93 (Supp. 1968).
50. The validity of the debts that arose from advances made to the corporation
was not at issue in Missouri Meat. 407 So. 2d at 20.
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to be sold at values below their market price. 1 The third circuit con-
cluded that the preferential transfer was invalid 2 but, nevertheless,
decided that the plaintiffs could not recover because the owners re-
ceived nothing of "value"53 as required by sections 92 and 93.
The Louisiana statutes4 and other state provisions' which address
the problem of unlawful distributions can be traced to the New York
Stock Corporation Law of 1890.56 Under this law, fradulent57 con-
veyances by officers and directors have been declared invalid since
the turn of the century. The third circuit, however, was unable to
redress the impropriety because the distribution was appraised as
worthless. Conceivably, the court could have placed an objective value
on the second mortgage." The preferential security interest had some
inherent value, notwithstanding the fact that the judicial sale returned
only enough funds to cover the first mortgage on the property. 9
As an alternative, the court in Missouri Meat could have conclud-
ed that the defunct corporation was merely the alter ego of its
51. The facts of the case suggest impropriety. For example, the former officers-
owners of the defendant corporation bought the corporation's only assets at the judicial
sale. 407 So. 2d at 20.
52. Id. at 21.
53. Id. at 22.
54. LA. R.S. 12:92 & 93 (Supp. 1968).
55. See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, S 174 (1974); MD. CORPS. & ASS'NS CODE ANN.
2-315 (Supp. 1982); N.J. STAT. ANN. S14A:6-12(1) (West Supp. 1982); N.Y. Bus. CORP.
LAW S 719 (McKinney 1977).
56. Section 48 (later moved to section 15) of the former Stock Corporation Law,
1890 N.Y. Laws 1075, was enacted in 1890 and was repealed with the adoption of
the present New York Business Corporation Law, effective September 1, 1963. The
purpose of section 48 was outlined in Munzinger v. United Press, 52 A.D. 338, 342,
65 N.Y.S. 194, 197 (1900).
The evil to be obviated by that section was the giving of a preference by an
insolvent corporation to its officers, directors, and stockholders who should become
aware of the insolvency before that fact could become known to the general public.
It was feared that in such a case they would be likely to devote the property
of the corporation to the payment of their own debts, and thereby leave nothing
for the other creditors who did not know of its condition.
Id. See also Anjopa Paper & Board Mfg. Co., 269 F. Supp. 241 (D.C.N.Y. 1967); Southern
Indus., Inc. v. Jeremias,'66 A.D.2d 178, 411 N.Y.S.2d 945 (1978); Whalen v. Strong,
249 A.D. 792, 292 N.Y.S. 385, affd, 275 N.Y. 516, 11 N.E.2d 321 (1937).
57. See Tacoma Ass'n of Credit Men v. Lester, 72 Wash. 2d 453, 433 P.2d 901
(1967); In re IMI, Inc., 17 Bankr. 784 (E.D. Wis. 1982).
58. See Ficor, Inc. v. McHugh, 639 P.2d 385 (Colo. 1982). Compare COLO. REV. STAT.
§7-5-114(3) (1973) with N.Y. Bus. CORP. LAW S 719 (McKinney 1963).
59. The jurisprudence generally recognizes that the amount realized at the forced
sale of previously transferred property does not necessarily reflect the ordinary
market value of such property. See DeWest Realty Corp. v. Internal Revenue Serv.,
418 '. Supp. 1274, 1279 (S.D.N.Y. 1976); Continental Oil Co. v. Zaring, 563 P.2d 964
(Colo. Ct. App. 1977).
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owners.10 This conclusion would have disregarded the corporate enti-
ty, resulting in unlimited liability for the shareholders. The facts of
the case do not readily justify a judicial piercing of the corporate veil,61
but the remedies in sections 92 and 93 are not the exclusive means
of relief for aggrieved creditors. 2
Agency Powers in a Close Corporation
The distinct character of the close corporation extends beyond
the area of shareholder interrelationships.' Contractual authority and
agency power always create an area of uncertainty, especially when
attached to the power and authority of the corporate officer."4
This is a problem inherent in the ramifications of any organiza-
tional form. Such problems have been unavoidable and insoluable
since the days when feudal lords objected to the practices of
subinfeudation and mortmain. The truth of the matter is that socie-
ty provides the forms of organization, but the law must struggle
with their consequences. 5
60. For a very through discussion of this approach, see Tigrett v. Pointer, 580
S.W.2d 375 (Tex. Civ. App. 1978). See also DeWitt Truck Brokers, Inc. v. W. Ray Flem-
ming Fruit Co., 540 F.2d 681, 685-87 (4th Cir. 1976).
61. See the discussion in the cases cited in note 60, supra.
62. See the sources cited in note 58, supra; see also Pepper v. Litton, 308 U.S.
295, 309-12 (1939); Duberstein v. Werner, 256 F. Supp. 515, 521 (E.D.N.Y. 1966). Under
facts similar to Missouri Meat, one court imposed a judgment lien on the property
in a third party purchaser's hands because of his knowledge of the creditor's claims,
i.e., the third party had notice and accepted the property subject thereto. Smith v.
Mississippi Livestock Producers Ass'n, 188 So. 2d 758 (Miss. 1966). For a misapplica-
tion of the Smith rationale, see Wood v. Gulf States Capital Corp., 217 So. 2d 257,
271-72 (Miss. 1968).
63. See text at notes 12-45, supra.
64. Although the same broad principles of corporation and agency law determine
the powers of officers in both close and publicly held corporations, the factual
differences in the patterns of operation of the two kinds of corporations lead to
wide disparities in the powers the courts actually recognize in corporate officers.
In a close corporation, ownership and management normally coalesce; and the
participants often conduct their enterprise internally much as if it were a part-
nership. The courts have seldom articulated a difference in the rules governing
officers' powers in close and publicly held corporations; yet they appear in fact
to have often cut through the technical legal form of close corporations, to reach
the results that would be reached if the enterprises were conducted as partner-
ships. In other words, the courts frequently, and perhaps usually, recognize in
officers of a close corporation the same powers that are possessed by partners
in a firm under the general rule of partnership law which makes each partner
an agent of the firm for the purposes of its business and empowers each partner
to bind the firm by acts apparently carried on to further the usual business of
the partnership.
2 F. O'NEAL, supra note 21, at S 8.05.




The expression of corporate authority preeminently manifests itself
in the board of directors. The collective action of the board epitomizes
the business policy of the inanimate corporate entity. 8 The complex
body of corporate law occasionally will be inadequate to resolve the
peculiar problems intrinsic to the close corporation. The task of the
judiciary is to avoid a draconian exegesis of the statutory law in favor
of a more practical consideration of the differences presented by the
corporate dichotomy. 7 The embodiment of agency problems confronted
the third circuit in Greenleaf Plantation, Inc. v. Kieffer.8 The plaintiff
brought suit for specific performance of an option to purchase a tract
of land from the defendants. The plaintiff was a small corporation
formed by two shareholders to raise cattle and farm soybeans. Not
surprisingly, the two shareholders were also the only officers of the
corporation. The defendants alleged that the option agreement was
invalid because the shareholder-officer who purported to exercise the
option was without express authority to contract for the purchase
of immovable property. The district court ruled in favor of the defen-
dants, but the third circuit reversed the decision on appeal.
The court determined that the absence of a resolution by the board
of directors was not fatal to the exercise of authority by the corporate
president. 9 Two important facts probably influenced the decision of
the court. First, the defendants did not complain of the president's
lack of authority to exercise the prior lease to which the option was
attached." Second, the plaintiff already had incurred expenses toward
completion of the sale when the defendant revealed his intention to
abrogate the contractual obligation. These facts suggest that the
66. See Coastal Pharmaceutical Co. v. Goldman, 213 Va. 831, 195 S.E.2d 848 (1973);
Moore v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 155 Va. 556, 155 S.E. 707 (1930).
67. Corporations are creatures of statutory law. The same law which creates them
provides procedures for the conduct of their affairs. Ordinarily, corporate con-
duct must conform to those procedures. But the total complex of corporate law
acknowledges that all corporations are not alike and recognizes that strict statutory
conformity, seldom practiced faithfully by the largest and most sophisticated cor-
porations, is impractical if not impossible for others. For the law to close its eyes
to the differences and attempt to compress all corporations into a neat little mold
would be to forsake realism for legalism and often to sacrifice justice for
standardization.
Coastal Pharmaceutical Co., 195 S.E.2d at 852. See generally American Fidelity Fire
Ins. Co. v. Construcciones Werl, Inc., 407 F. Supp. 164 (D.V.I. 1975); Lettieri v. American
Say. Bank, 182 Conn. 1, 437 A.2d 822 (1980); Terminal Freezers, Inc. v. Roberts Frozen
Foods, Inc., 41 Ill. App. 3d 981, 354 N.E.2d 904 (1976); Sturgeon v. State Bank of Fisk,
616 S.W.2d 578 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981).
68. 403 So. 2d 100 (La. App. 3d Cir.), writ denied, 409 So. 2d 675 (La. 1981).
69. Id. at 102. See text and authorities cited at notes 64-67, supra.
70. See American Fidelity Fire Ins. Co. v. Construcciones Werl, Inc., 407 F. Supp.
164 (D.V.I. 1975). See generally Trio Mobile Homes, Inc. v. West, 240 Ga. 474, 241 S.E.2d
234 (1978); B & C Enterprises v. Utter, 88 Nev. 433, 498 P.2d 1327 (1972).
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equities of the case favored the plaintiff, but the law may have been
against it.' The legal rationale of the court intimates that the law
may have been contrary to the outcome. The court's reliance on the
doctrines of estoppel, ratification, and apparent authority 2 suggests
inconclusiveness, inasmuch as any single theory would have been suf-
ficient to bind the defendant to the contract.
Resolving the consequences of corporate authority is a matter
within the purview of state law. Without exception, each state has
endeavored to unravel the problem of "officer authority""3 within close
corporations. Most jurisdictions have expanded traditional concepts
by increasing a chief officer's executive authority to include the power
to enter into contracts that are within the ordinary course of the
business." In Sturgeon v. State Bank of Fisk, the executive power was
characterized as implied authority.
It is now well settled that when in the usual course of the business
of a corporation an officer has been allowed to manage its affairs,
his authority to represent the corporation may be implied from
the manner in which he has been permitted by the directors to
transact its business. 5
The Greenleaf court labored to find the exact legal theory under which
71. See Marsh Inv. Corp. v. Langford, 490 F. Supp. 1320, 1327 (E.D. La. 1980),
affd per curiam, 652 F.2d 583 (5th Cir. 1981); Greenleaf, 403 So. 2d at 105 (Domengeaux,
J., dissenting); Lee Moving & Storage, Inc. v. Bourgeois, 343 So. 2d 1192 (La. App.
4th Cir. 1977).
72. 403 So. 2d at 104.
73. The problem centers around the extent of authority given an officer solely
by virtue of his office. Clearly, an officer lacks the inherent power to execute a con-
tract of unusual or extraordinary nature. Southwest Forest Indus., Inc. v. Sharfstein,
482 F.2d 915 (7th Cir. 1972); Goldenberg v. Bartell Broadcasting Corp., 47 Misc. 2d
105, 262 N.Y.S.2d 274 (Sup. Ct. 1965).
At one end of the legal spectrum is the view that the office bestows no authority
upon an officer. The more realistic and developing position is that the president
has the residual authority to enter contracts binding upon the corporation that
are within the ordinary course of its business. Determining what constitutes "or-
dinary" must be done on a case by case basis. It will depend upon, among other
factors: the industry concerned, the custom and practice within the trade, past
practice, the dollar amount of the transaction relative to the corporation's finan-
cial status, the presence or absence of an emergency, etc.
A. WOLFE & F. NAFFZIGER, LEGAL PERSPECTIVES OF AMERICAN BUSINESS ASSOCIATIONS
344 (1977).
74. See Royal Mfg. Co. v. Denard & Moore Const. Co., 137 Ga. App. 650, 224 S.E.2d
770 (1976); Hauptman v. Edwards, Inc., 170 Mont. 310, 553 P.2d 975 (1976); cf. Foster
v. Blake Heights Corp., 530 P.2d 815 (Utah 1974) (secretary-treasurer had no authority
to enter into a contract for the sale of corporate real estate).
75. Sturgeon v. State Bank of Fisk, 616 S.W.2d 578, 584 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (cita-
tions omitted); see also Terminal Freezers, Inc. v. Roberts Frozen Foods, Inc., 41 II.
App. 3d 981, 354 N.E.2d 904 (1976).
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it should bind the parties. Nevertheless, the message of Greenleaf is
clear: third parties on notice of an agency relationship should deter-
mine for themselves the nature and extent of the agent's authority."6
This position is consonant with the general agency law of Louisiana.7
Third parties generally are considered as having entered into con-
tractual transactions with corporate officers at their own risk. If the
plaintiff had breached -the contract in Greenleaf, then the court clear-
ly would have found the presence of authority to exercise the option.
Necessarily, the converse must also be true; a corporation cannot be
required to assume the liabilities of such a contract and be denied
its benefits. If implied or de facto authorization is sufficient to bind
the corporation and its stockholders to obligations, then it is also suf-
ficient to validate their rights.78
Erick V. Anderson
76. See A. WOLFE & F. NAFFZIGER, supra note 73, at 344.
77. See Buckley v. Woodlawn Dev. Corp., 233 La. 662, 98 So. 2d 92 (1957); Graves
v. Pelican Downs, Inc., 292 So. 2d 297 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1974); Carey Hodges Assoc.
v. Continental Fidelity Corp., 264 So. 2d 734 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1972).
78. See Coastal Pharmaceutical Co., 195 S.E.2d at 852.
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